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Abstract  The primary aim of this paper was to shed 
light on the impact of subjective alternative wage, wage 
changes and wage discrimination on job search behavior of 
employees. The research was based on primary data; the 
survey was conducted among Hungarian internet user 
employees. Our results suggest that regardless of their job 
search behavior employees are aware of alternative wages, 
which have the greatest impact on intentions to quit and 
active search. With respect to wage cut and wage increase we 
have found that they are both significant; the former has 
strong positive effect on intentions to quit and active search, 
while the latter reduces the probability of on-the-job search. 
To our best knowledge, this study was the first to reveal 
direct impact of wage discrimination on job search behavior 
of employees according to which there is a weak, but 
positive effect on intentions to quit and active search. Last 
but not least, the results of our study confirm the role of 
non-financial incentives in job search, where 
superior-subordinate relationships have a special 
importance. 
Keywords  On-the-job Search, Alternative Wages, 
Wage Discrimination, Wage Cuts, Superior-subordinate 
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1. Introduction 
Job mobility plays an essential role in the correction of 
imperfect job match; it is a mechanism that can foster the 
optimal allocation of human resources. At the same time, 
on-the-job search of employees and the resulting turnover 
represent significant cost to firms. Costs arise from the 
recruitment and training of new employees, on the one hand, 
and sunk costs of trained employees on the other, if the cost 
of training has only been partly paid back until the moment 
of quitting. Hence, the reduction of turnover is an important 
task of the corporate management, which, however, requires 
an in-depth knowledge of factors influencing intentions to 
quit. The most important projection of job search theory 
models (Burdett [19], Jesper at al. [7]) is that the higher the 
employer's wage, the lower the potential gain derived from 
job search, which, therefore, reduces the tendency to look for 
another job. Based on establishment level wages Martin [9] 
found a significant negative relationship between wages and 
turnover; that is, the higher the establishment wage, the 
lower the turnover. Ponzo [22] and Fuentes [2], among 
others, came to a similar conclusion using Italian and British 
data respectively. Furthermore, numerous researchers have 
inserted alternative wage into the regression model along 
with the own wage. Based on the literature, one of the most 
important driving factors for on-the-job search is the 
difference between the own-wage and the alternative wage. 
Based on industry level wages, Shorey [18] found that quits 
are positively influenced by the form of the external wage 
distribution, represented by its mean and variance. Black [21] 
found that the coefficient is significantly positive for the 
difference between the own-wage and the wage predicted by 
individual and firm characteristics, which also proves that 
employees react to other potential wages; the higher the 
available wage the more likely the worker to look for other 
jobs. However, the shortcoming of the above-mentioned 
studies is that they predicted the individual behavior based 
on industry-level wages or estimated alternative wages; 
therefore, they only provide for an indirect evidence on its 
impact. Souza-Poza and Henneberger's [4] study, to our best 
knowledge, has so far been the only one, in which the authors 
conducted a survey to reveal employees’ subjective opinion 
on their own-wages and its impact on the job search behavior. 
Researchers asked respondents whether they thought their 
own-wage was high or low, and found that high wage level 
had a significantly negative effect on employees’ quitting 
intention. The question was; however, somewhat ambiguous, 
since it did not clearly determine the reference wage 
(compared to which their own-wage regarded as high or low): 
the wage of employees working in the same field in the same 
firm, the own reservation wage, or the alternative wage 
available elsewhere. One of the novelties of this study is that 
it takes the subjective opinion of employees on alternative 
wage into account when it comes to explaining on-the-job 
search. In connection, we have also examined whether only 
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job seekers are aware of alternative wages, or whether the 
majority of employees have an idea of other available wages. 
In accordance with the above described, the first two 
research questions are as follows: 
1. Do employees have an idea on potentially available 
wages only if they are looking for another job at the 
moment, or they do so even if they are not actively 
involved in the job search? 
2. Does the alternative wage perceived by the employees 
have a significant effect on intentions to quit or active 
search? 
Furthermore, an important factor of on-the-job search is 
the change in wage level, but there are quite few available 
empirical results on the subject. Bewley [31] conducted 
interviews with CEOs about the damaging effects of a 
potential wage cut; CEOs most frequently pointed at the 
deterioration of work moral and the reduction of productivity; 
moreover, they especially highlighted the voluntary quitting 
of employees. Cambell and Kamlani [8] asked compensation 
professionals to evaluate the importance of different reasons 
for the reluctance to make wage cuts in recessions and they 
gave the most weight to the potential loss of the most 
productive workers. Wage cut is rare as an event in the life of 
an employee, if occurs at all, as opposed to wage increase, 
which is substantially more frequent. Based on the data 
reported by the Bureau of Labor Statistics between 1957 and 
1978, Akerlof at al. [13] found that in most years, the 
proportion of employees who suffered a wage cut never 
exceeded a maximum of 4 percent, while each year at least 
87 percent of the employees did benefit from a wage increase. 
Clark, Georgellis and Sanfey [6] studied the effect of change 
in wage level over two periods on voluntary quitting, and 
found that if the change in wage level was lower – due to a 
smaller wage increase, or a greater wage cut – the probability 
for voluntary quitting increased. Nevertheless, the authors 
did not show the effects of wage cut and wage increase 
separately, even though it would be important to know 
whether they are both significant or not, as well as their 
effect on job search behavior. Hence, our third research 
question is the following: 
3. Does wage cut and a wage increase have a significant 
effect on intention to quit and active search? 
In addition to wage variables, the effect of job satisfaction 
on intentions to quit has been receiving more and more 
attention in recent years (Shields and Price [24]). Based on 
data retrieved from cross-national surveys Souza-Poza and 
Henneberger [4] found that job satisfaction has one of the 
strongest influence on intentions to quit. Using survey data 
of public sector employees in the Netherlands, Delfgaauw 
[16] shows that workers' satisfaction with various job 
domains not only affects whether but also where workers 
search for another job. The author argues that workers try to 
leave their current employer when they are uncomfortable 
with an organisation-specific job domain, like management, 
but when they are dissatisfied with a job domains which may 
have an industry-specific component, such as job duties, they 
want to leave their industry. Based on the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) data for Danish 
families, Kristensen and Westergard-Nielsen [25] found that 
inclusion of job satisfaction does improve the ability to 
predict actual quit behavior: low overall job satisfaction 
significantly increases the probability of quit. The authors 
ranked various job satisfaction domains according to their 
ability to predict quits and they found that satisfaction with 
type of work is the most important job characteristic while 
satisfaction with job security is insignificant. Clark [5] uses 
labour market spell data from the first seven waves of the 
British Household Panel Survey and one of his main result 
was that the comparison of the power of seven domain job 
satisfaction measures in quit equation yields a ranking of job 
characteristics: job security and pay are the most important, 
followed by use of initiative, the work itself, and hours of 
work. Interestingly, the relationship of supervisors was 
statistically significant, but did not have a strong impact on 
quits. 
There is an extensive literature studying wage 
discrimination as well as its impact on job satisfaction 
(Pfeffer and Langton [17], Johnson and Lambrinos [32], 
Groshen [12]); and the results show that wage discrimination 
significantly decreases job satisfaction. According to a 
survey led among faculty members, Pfeffer and Langton [17] 
found that the higher the spread of wages across the faculty, 
the lower the job satisfaction and research performance of 
faculty members, and they are less likely to cooperate during 
researches. However, to our knowledge, there are no studies 
exploring a direct relationship between wage discrimination 
and on-the-job search behavior. Barth and Dale-Olsen [11] 
found that excess turnover of workers in the establishments 
is significantly more sensitive to the wage premium of men 
than to that of women, which implies a higher elasticity of 
labour supply facing each establishment for men than for 
women. The authors argue that this difference provides 
employers with an incentive to employ the policy of 
monopsonistic discrimination. The shortcoming of the study 
is that it only showed the possibility of wage discrimination; 
therefore, our fourth research question is the following: 
4. Does wage discrimination have a direct effect on 
intentions to quit and active search? 
Apart from wage related variables and job satisfaction, 
individual characteristics also significantly influence the 
probability of on-the-job search. The elderly are less likely to 
look for a job, which is partly due to the fact they have a 
greater difficulty in learning the skills required by new jobs, 
while at the new job they can only benefit from the higher 
wages for a shorter period of time (Black [21], Fuentes [2]). 
On the other hand they can face discrimination when 
applying for new jobs and this may present an obstacle and 
disincentive for them to quit (Schuster and Miller [23]). 
Because of child care and other domestic duties women have 
higher opportunity cost; therefore, they are less prone to 
search for a new job (Keith and McWilliams [20], Burgess 
and Low [26], Ponzo [22]). However, Booth and 
Francesconi [3] found no large differences in quit rates 
between genders. In addition, the level of education has a 
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positive effect on the propensity of on-the-job search, since 
high-skilled workers have better labor market alternatives 
(Theodossiou and Zangelidis [14], Pissarides and 
Wadsworth [10]). Short tenure has a positive effect on the 
propensity to quit (Fuentes [2]), as opposed to a high tenure 
as the latter implies that the current match between the 
worker and the employer is the best one available in the 
labour market (Ponzo [22]). 
In addition, the number of individuals living in one 
household effects on-the-job search negatively because the 
bigger the household is the more costly it is to move in case a 
new job demands so (Ponzo [22]). According to the 
empirical literature, job market conditions and employer 
characteristics have an effect on employee's intention to quit. 
A high local unemployment rate and a low economic growth 
will lower the likelihood of employees looking for a new job 
(Black [21], Pissarides and Wadsworth [10]). A number of 
studies have shown that the existence of a trade union lower 
the incentives for on-the-job search (Freeman [30], Miller 
and Mulvey [27]). Freeman and Medoff [29] argued that 
trade unions reduce turnover by creating desirable working 
conditions and by providing discontented workers with a 
voice alternative to quitting their jobs. Moreover, the 
ownership structure of the employee has an unequivocal 
effect on quitting; that is, ceteris paribus, public ownership 
reduces the intensity of on-the-job search and the number of 
quits (Bartel and Borjas [1], Ippolito [28]). According to 
Ponzo [22] public sector employees are at an advantage for 
various reasons; such as a lower risk of losing their jobs, they 
experience a lower pressure by managers and supervisors to 
provide effort on the job, their work environment is calmer 
and; therefore, they are less likely to start looking for a new 
job. 
2. Data 
Data was obtained, besides the Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office-Labor Force Survey (HCSO-LFS), from a 
database called NetPanel developed by NRC Ltd. The 
database contains demographic (age, gender, region type, 
qualification, marital status, size of household) information 
on 140 000 internet users. Members of NetPanel 1  are 
committed to occasionally fill out questionnaires on the 
company's website, which allowed us to obtain the necessary 
data otherwise not accessible from secondary data source. 
Only individuals, who were employed at the moment of 
conducting the survey received the questionnaire, hence the 
sample did not include the unemployed and the 
self-employed. The questionnaire was handed out in three 
waves over the months of October and November, 2011 
(2000, 1200 and 1200 people received it respectively), while 
1Subscribing for NetPanel of NRC Ltd. is voluntary; members are incited by 
sweepstakes to join, but filling out a questionnaire does not necessarily 
involve a prize. Internet users can receive information about NetPanel 
through advertisements, which appear in 300 mostly visited Hungarian 
websites. Visitors of these websites cover the 90% of the Hungarian 
population using internet at least once a week.  
another 1200 people were included in the sample in April, 
2012. The sample was weighted and representative for the 
population aged between 18 and 65, surfing the web at least 
once a week, based on attributes as to gender, age group, 
qualification and region type. In the beginning of the 
questionnaire, respondents were informed that each question 
concerns their main job. The dependent variable is job search 
intensity with the aim to separate as much as possible those 
who are fully satisfied at their current workplace, and hence, 
don't even think of looking for a new place, from those who 
are somewhat unsatisfied with their current employer. A 
further aspect was to separate within the unsatisfied group 
those who had only an intention to start searching for a job or 
have already checked job posts, and perhaps even asked 
acquaintances for possible options, but have not actually 
applied yet, from those who have actually applied. 
Accordingly, from the following three statements 
respondents had to choose the one that best characterized 
him or her with regards to the past year or, in case the 
employment period was shorter, to the period from entering 
the workplace: "I would like to stay at my current job for as 
long as possible", "I thought of looking for another job", "I 
have already applied for another job". The value of the 
dependent variable could be 1, 2, or 3 respectively. Table 1 
shows the descriptive statistics of the data. Those who 
received a fixed wage were requested to provide the sum of 
the previous month's net wage, individuals receiving partly 
or fully commission based wage had to provide the average 
monthly net wage with respect to the past six months; while 
employees with a shorter employment period had to 
calculate the average monthly net wage for the period from 
entering to the workplace. It must be noted that wages of the 
April, 2012 wave were discounted to the level of November, 
2011. Respondents had to define the amount of the 
potentially available wage relative to their own-wage 
according to the following scale: much less = 1, somewhat 
less = 2, approx. the same amount = 3, somewhat more = 4, 
much more = 5. Thereafter, we refer to this variable as 
subjective alternative wage. According to the results, 19% of 
the subjects couldn't or didn't want to answer these questions. 
In addition, two binary dependent variables were created in 
order to examine the effect of job search on alternative wage. 
If the employee had an opinion about alternative wage the 
value of the first dependent variable was 1; and 0 if the 
respondent claimed not to know the relative amount of 
alternative wage in comparison to his or her own wage. The 
second dependent variable was similarly 1, if the employee 
had an opinion on alternative wage; and 0 if he or she didn't 
know or didn't answer to this question at all. General 
propensity to respond was measured by a variable that 
contained the numbers of questions to which the employee 
did not give any answer. It was assumed that wage cut is a 
rather rare event, while wage increase is more frequent; 
therefore, with regard to wage cut we asked whether there 
was an occasion when the current employer reduced the 
wage, while with regard to wage increase the most recent 
time of wage increase had to be provided by the respondent. 
                                                             
  Advances in Economics and Business 3(1): 22-32, 2015 25 
 
Results showed that 23% of the respondents had suffered a 
wage cut at their current job. The relatively high proportion 
of wage cuts could be attributed to several government 
measurements. As an aftermath of the tax changes in January, 
2011 a significant number of employees could have 
experienced cuts in net wages, if their employer had not 
given any wage increase or had not increased their gross 
wages sufficiently. Sixty one percent of employers who cut 
respondent's wages are in majority public ownership. Among 
respondents, who claimed to have experienced wage cuts, 
there is a big proportion of public employers, which is most 
likely due to the elimination of the 13th month pay in 2009. 
Answers to most recent time of wage increase could be the 
following: 0 = never, 1 = more than 2 years ago, 2 = one or 
two years ago, 3 = within the past 6 to 12 months, 4 = within 
the past 6 months. In order to measure wage discrimination 
respondents had to rate from 1 to 6 the statement "In the 
same position, with the same tasks, everybody is paid 
equally", where 1 = "I totally agree" and 6 = "I totally 
disagree". The statement on superior -subordinate 
relationship was the following: "The relationship among 
superiors and subordinates is good at my workplace", which 
had to be rated on a scale of 1 to 6, as in the case of wage 
discrimination. Status at workplace was measured through 
the following categories: 1 = blue collar worker, 2 = white 
collar worker, 3 = middle management, 4 = senior 
management. Moreover, tenure was also measured with a 
categorical variable according to the following: less than a 
year = 1, 1 to 4 years = 2, 5 to 9 years = 3, 10 years or longer 
= 4. Qualification was measured through 9 categories 
according to the HCSO-LFS that was merged into the 
following four categories: 1 = elementary school 8 grades or 
less, 2 = vocational training, 3 = secondary education 
(secondary vocational school, high school, technical school), 
4 = college or university. With the help of dummy variables 
we measured the presence of trade unions or works council at 
the employer, and whether the employer was publicly owned 
by at least 50% or not. NetPanel provides information on the 
number of individuals per household, according to which 
there were 2.94 persons per household on average. Besides 
the number of individuals per household, we also obtained 
information on their age and county. The latter was used to 
insert unemployment rates by county, retrieved from the 
HCSO-LFS, into the regression equations. 
3. Hypotheses and Econometric 
Methods 
Regardless of their job search behavior the majority of the 
respondents (89%) have an idea about the prevailing 
alternative wage. Therefore, in connection to our first 
research question we articulated the following hypothesis: 
H1. On-the-job search does not have a significant effect 
on the awareness of alternative wage. 
Hypothesis H1 was tested in the multivariate logit model, 
where awareness of alternative wage was the dependent 
variable, while independent variables were search intensity, 
the logarithm of own-wage, company characteristics (such as 
the owner, the existence of a trade union), individual 
characteristics (such as position, qualification, age, gender) 
and the general propensity to respond. As stated in the 
literature presented in the introduction, calculated alternative 
wage has a strong positive effect on job search intention and 
quits. Consequently, it seems plausible that subjective 
alternative wage has a similar effect; therefore, the next 
hypothesis related to our second research question is this: 
H2. A much higher and somewhat higher subjective 
alternative wages have a significant and positive effect on 
search intention and active search. 
Together with alternative wage, the logarithm of own 
wage as a control variable was also inserted into the model, 
and based on empirical results we expect it to have a negative 
effect on search intention and active search. Furthermore, 
based on the results described in the introduction we could 
assume a positive effect of wage cut and a negative effect of 
wage increase on quits. Having the possibility to examine the 
two events separately, it can be considered useful to assess 
whether they are both significant, and whether their impact is 
as it had been expected. On that account, our next hypothesis 
related to wage cut and wage increase is formulated as 
below:  
H3/A. A former wage cut has a significant and positive 
effect on the intentions to quit and active search. 
H3/B. A more recent wage increase has a significant and 
negative effect on the intentions to quit and active search. 
To our best knowledge, there has not been a study to 
reveal direct effect of wage discrimination on the job search 
behavior of employees. Nevertheless, in accordance with the 
literature we can assume that wage discrimination 
significantly reduces job satisfaction; and the lower the level 
of job satisfaction, the higher the motivation for job search. 
With this in mind, the following hypothesis was formulated: 
H4. The effect of wage discrimination on intentions to 
quit and active search is positive.  
Hypotheses H2-H4 were tested in a multivariate discrete 
choice model, where search behavior was the dependent 
variable. Job search behavior is characterized by search 
intensity, classified into three categories: (1) respondent has 
not looked for another job (and has not even thought of doing 
so); (2) has thought of looking for another job (has search 
intention); (3) has already been looking for a new workplace 
since being employed at his or her current workplace (active 
search). With respect to search intensity, the previously 
mentioned categories are ranked as below: search intention 
means a level higher search intensity than not having thought 
of searching at all; and active search is ranked one level 
higher than having an intention only. As a dependent 
variable, job search is ordered, however, considering the fact 
that the proportional odds assumption is violated based on 
the Brant test; therefore, ordered-logit model cannot be 
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applied. The stereotype logit model represents a solution to 
this problem, because it does not require the proportional 
odds assumptions (Anderson [15]). In the case of stereotype 
logit model, the probability of s category to occur during 
observation number i is the following: Pr�𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠 |𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1 … . 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖� = exp (𝛽𝛽0𝑠𝑠+𝜑𝜑𝑠𝑠 ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖=1 )∑ exp(𝑘𝑘𝑡𝑡=1 𝛽𝛽0𝑡𝑡+𝜑𝜑𝑡𝑡 ∑ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖=1 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖)    (1) 
where 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖1 … . 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the explanatory variables belonging to 
the observation number i, the number of categories of the 
dependent variables is 𝑘𝑘  (in our case 3), 𝛽𝛽  are the 
coefficients of explanatory variables to be estimated, and 𝜑𝜑 
are the ranking parameters to be estimated. We inserted wage 
related variables (the logarithm of net wage, alternative wage, 
wage cut, the date of the last wage increase, wage 
discrimination), company characteristics 
(superior-subordinate relations, public employer, the 
existence of a trade union), demographic and labor market 
attributes (gender, age, status, tenure, size of household, 
qualification, unemployment rate by county) into the 
regression equation. The unemployment rate is defined at the 
county level; therefore, the standard errors are corrected for 
the potential clustering of the residual. The expected 
direction of wage related variables are shown in H2-H4 
hypotheses; while with regards to the expected effect of 
control variables (company characteristics, demographic and 
labor market attributes) we can rely on the empirical results 
mentioned in the introduction. 
4. Estimation Results 
Before examining the factors influencing on-the-job 
search behavior, we have to understand whether only 
employees looking for a job are aware of available 
alternative wages, or whether employees generally have an 
idea of what the elsewhere potentially accessible wages are. 
There are two binary dependent variables, each of which 
took the value of 1 in case the employee was aware of the 
relative amount of alternative wage in comparison to his or 
her own wage. The first dependent variable took on the value 
of 0, if the employee didn't know the answer, while the 
second dependent variable did so if the employee didn't 
know or didn't respond to the question at all. Results of the 
logit model are shown in Table 2 (model 1 shows results of 
the first dependent variable; and model 2 reflects the second 
dependent variable). The search variable is not significant in 
neither of the models, which allows us to accept our first 
hypothesis. Among the other explanatory variables tenure, 
public employer, as well as age for model 1, had a negative 
effect on the awareness of alternative wages, while a higher 
own-wage and vocational qualification affected it positively. 
However, it should be noted that, to a certain extent, the 
phrasing of the questions and the method of data collection 
could have influenced the results. However unlikely it may 
be, there is a chance that some proportion of non-searchers 
did not in fact know the alternative wages, and only 
responded because they were asked to. Certainly, this does 
not provide a satisfactory explanation for not having ticked 
"I don't know" instead.  
Next in our analysis we looked into factors influencing job 
search where we applied the stereotype logit regression 
model mentioned in Section 3. Table 3 shows marginal 
effects with respect to the last two exit categories, where 
"search intention" is exit category No. 2 and "active search" 
is exit category No. 3, while Table 4 represents odds ratios. 
We performed estimations on the full sample, and also on 
subsamples by gender; in what follows, if not noted 
otherwise, the presented estimation results regard the full 
sample. As we have expected a high own-wage reduces the 
probability of intention to quit and active search for both 
genders; however, it had a somewhat stronger impact among 
men. The relative size of alternative wage in comparison to 
the own-wage significantly influences intentions to quit and 
active search. If the alternative wage is much more that 
means an increase of 13.9 percentage point in the probability 
of intentions to quit, and an increase of 14.3 percentage point 
in the probability of active search. A somewhat less or much 
less alternative wage reduces the probability of intentions to 
quit and active search to a lesser extent than the extent to 
which a somewhat more or much more alternative wage 
increases it. These results hence allow us to accept our 
second hypothesis according to which alternative wage has a 
significant effect on intentions to quit and active search.   
One important innovation of this study is that it provides 
separate information on the impact of wage increase and 
wage cut on job search behavior of employees. We found 
that if an employee had suffered wage cut previously at his 
current workplace it increased the probability of both 
intention to quit and active search (by 6.15 and 3.79 
percentage points respectively); however, the impact was 
stronger among women. With respect to wage increase we 
have found that it is significant, and when the closer the date 
of wage increase was to the present, as expected, the less the 
probability of job search became. In accordance with the 
above mentioned results we accept the third hypothesis. Here, 
it should be noted that we don't know the degree of past wage 
increase and wage cuts.  
The variable, which has not been subject of any analysis 
regarding its direct impact on the employee's job search 
behavior, is wage discrimination. Employees compare their 
current wages not only to wages available elsewhere, but 
also to wages of equally performing colleagues in the same 
position. The variable is significant and, as expected, the 
more negative the view on wage discrimination is the more 
the probability of on-the-job search increases, nevertheless 
the extent of its impact is surprisingly weak. In accordance to 
the estimation results we can accept our fourth hypothesis; 
that is, wage discrimination has a significant and positive 
effect on intentions to quit and active search. 
In what follows we will briefly look into the estimated 
effects of control variables describing job and firm 
characteristics. Results show that a one-level-worse 
superior-subordinate relationship increases the probability of 
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intentions to quit by 6.77 percentage point; and of active 
search by 3.79 percentage point, while we kept all other 
variables at their means. Promotion could be one of the 
driving factors of voluntary quits; hence, we supposed that 
the higher the employee's position the less likely he or she is 
to look for another workplace. The negative coefficient 
confirms this; one step higher in the hierarchy decreases the 
probability of active search by 1.42 percentage point. For 
women, a higher position has a greater counter-incentive 
impact on job search. A majority public-owned employer 
significantly decreases intentions to quit, by more than 5 
percentage point, (compared to a not public-owned 
employer); however, the influence among men is 
significantly more elevated (7.13 percentage points). The 
negative effect of a publicly owned company on on-the-job 
search can be the source of several effects. In our opinion, 
one of the most important features of public employers is the 
fact that they mostly offer jobs in professions (educator, 
police officer, firemen, health workers, transport professions) 
that are rare among private employers, which in itself 
reduces the number of potential alternative jobs. The special 
professional experience accumulated at a public employer is 
often difficult to convert into the knowledge required at most 
private companies even in fields that are otherwise common 
for private employers. In accordance with previous 
researches, the existence of a trade union, or works council at 
the employer had a significant and negative effect on the 
probability of job search, but only among men (the 
probability of active search decreased by 1.8 percentage 
point).  
Finally, we will briefly present the effects of demographic 
and labor market control variables. It is important to note the 
role of tenure: an employment period of more than one year 
but of maximum 4 years increases the probability of active 
search relative to the reference category (1 year, or shorter 
employment period) by 4.2 percentage point, while an 
employment period of 5 to 9 years only increases it by 2.37 
percentage point. An employment period of 10 years or more 
did not have any significant effect neither on intentions to 
quit, nor on active search. Those who started working for 
their current employer recently or just a couple of years ago 
have a quite vivid memory of searching for a job, of 
prevailing alternative wages, and hence, they start easier 
looking for another job again, if they had realized in the 
meantime that the current workplace does not perfectly 
match their expectations. Later, when they have accumulated 
a greater amount of workplace-specific skills they feel much 
less motivated to look for a new place, which in most cases, 
would require them to acquire new professional knowledge. 
Age has a similar effect as tenure; the beginning of the 
working-age has a moderate but positive effect on intentions 
to quit and active search. The age-squared is significantly 
negative, based on which it seems that older people are less 
willing to change job. In accordance with previous studies 
(Fuentes [2], Pissarides and Wadsworth [10]), the effect of 
qualification is highly significant and positive, which shows 
that employees with a higher qualification are more likely to 
look for a new job while being employed. Our analysis 
shows that one level higher qualification increases the 
probability of active search by 3.43 percentage point. 
According to previous explanations (Ponzo [22]), this is due 
to the fact that more qualified employees are more effective 
in searching for a job, because of their bigger social network 
and better relations, and therefore have more employment 
options. In our view, the higher search activity of employees 
with a higher qualification can also be attributed to the fact 
that their skills and professions can be applied in a wider 
range of fields as opposed to that of low or not qualified 
employees. A wider selection of job opportunities runs the 
risk that the employee will have to switch jobs several times 
in order to find a place that matches his or her competences, 
interest and wage requirement. In accordance with the 
literature, gender has a significant effect on job search; a 
male employee is 1.9 percent more likely to look for a job 
while being employed. The difficulty of finding a new job 
greatly depends on the job supply relevant for the employee. 
Ceteris paribus, an employee will be less likely to look for a 
new job, if he or she would face difficulties in finding a 
better job. Differences between regional labor markets are 
very high in Hungary; therefore, in the regression we 
included the logarithm of the unemployment rate by county. 
The results show that the effect of the unemployment rate by 
county is only significant for women and has a negative 
effect on the job search behavior. That is, a one percent 
increase in the county unemployment rate reduces the 
probability of active job search by 1.58 percentage point. 
The number of individuals living in one household is only 
significant for women; an extra habitant decreases the 
probability of active search by 1 percentage point. One 
possible explanation for this result is that the more 
individuals live together the greater the amount of the 
domestic work becomes, which usually falls on women, and 
hence, they have less time to search for a job. 
5. Conclusions 
In this study, we examined factors influencing on-the-job 
search with a special focus on subjective alternative wage, 
change in wage level and wage discrimination based on a 
representative sample of Hungarian internet-user employees 
aged between 18 and 65. Our estimation results suggest that 
on-the-job search has no significant impact on the awareness 
of alternative wages. It seems that regardless of job search 
behavior employees are aware of the prevailing alternative 
wages, which have the greatest influence on intention to quit 
and active search. Our contribution to the literature regarding 
the effect of changes in wage level is that we have separately 
measured the effects of wage cut and wage increase, and we 
found that they are both significant; the former has strong 
positive effect on intentions to quit and active search, while 
the latter reduces the probability of on-the-job search. To our 
best knowledge, this study is the first in revealing a direct 
effect of wage discrimination on job search behavior 
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according to which there is a weak, but positive effect on 
on-the-job search. The most important conclusion of this 
study is that in order to retain good employees it is certainly 
not enough to provide them with a high own wage in 
comparison to their reservation wage. Employees are 
sensitive to further wage-related effects, such as alternative 
wage, change in wage level, and wage discrimination. 
Finally, the results of this study confirm the role of 
non-financial motives in job search. In this respect, 
superior-subordinate relationships seem to have a special 
importance. A bad superior-subordinate relationship has a 
strong positive effect on the job search behavior of 
employees. 
Appendix 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics 
Variables Observations Mean Variance Median Minimum Maximum 
Search 5588 1,62 0,7 1 1 3 
Net own-wage 4703 8 87811 110000 26000 2008000 
Do not know the alternative wage 5118 0,11 0,32 0 0 1 
Subjective alternative wage 4536 2,61 1,04 3 1 6 
Subjective alternative wage is much less 4536 0,18 0,38 0 0 1 
Subjective alternative wage is somewhat less 4536 0,22 0,41 0 0 1 
Subjective alternative wage is roughly the same 4536 0,42 0,49 0 0 1 
Subjective alternative wage is somewhat more 4536 0,13 0,34 0 0 1 
Subjective alternative wage is much more 4536 0,03 0,17 0 0 1 
Wage cut 5596 0,23 0,42 0 0 1 
Date of last wage increase 5597 1,74 1,48 2 0 4 
Wage discrimination 5593 3,61 1,91 4 1 6 
Superior-subordinate relationship 5592 3,07 1,56 3 1 6 
Position 5590 3,26 0,68 3 1 4 
Union 5590 0,47 0,5 0 0 1 
State owner 5586 0,35 0,48 0 0 1 
Tenure 5589 2,62 1,07 2 1 4 
Tenure: less than 1 year 5589 0,16 0,37 0 0 1 
Tenure: from 1 to 4 years 5589 0,34 0,23 0 0 1 
Tenure: from 5 to 9 years 5589 0,2 0,4 0 0 1 
Tenure: 10 years, or more 5589 0,3 0,46 0 0 1 
Male 5600 0,55 0,5 0 0 1 
Age 5600 38,46 10,39 37 18 65 
Elementary school 5600 0,02 0,15 0 0 1 
Vocational training 5600 0,24 0,43 0 0 1 
Secondary school 5600 0,38 0,49 0 0 1 
College, university  5600 0,36 0,48 0 0 1 
Size of household  5600 2,94 1,26 3 1 6 
Unemployment rate by County 5600 0,11 0,31 0,1 0,06 0,18 
 
  
  Advances in Economics and Business 3(1): 22-32, 2015 29 
 
Table 2.  Determinants of the awareness of alternative wage. Logit estimates 
 
Model I.  Model II. 
Odds ratio Marginal effects  Odds ratio Marginal effects 
Search 1.126 0.0100  1.045 0.00568 
 (0.0960) (0.00721)  (0.0696) (0.00859) 
Log own-wage 2.342*** 0.0720***  2.377*** 0.112*** 
 (0.352) (0.0126)  (0.276) (0.0148) 
State owner 0.756** -0.0246**  0.687*** -0.0504*** 
 (0.0947) (0.0114)  (0.0659) (0.0134) 
Position 1.046432 0.991653  0.974 -0.00337 
 (0.155) (0.0155)  (0.140) (0.0187) 
Union 1.072 0.00584  1.034 0.00426 
 (0.133) (0.0104)  (0.0996) (0.0124) 
Vocational training 1.761* 0.0428**  1.786** 0.0678** 
 (0.558) (0.0216)  (0.445) (0.0264) 
Secondary 1.278 0.0203  1.514* 0.0516* 
 (0.401) (0.0254)  (0.375) (0.0299) 
College, university 1.006 0.000519  1.300 0.0329 
 (0.331) (0.0277)  (0.337) (0.0317) 
Tenure 0.872** -0.0116**  0.821*** -0.0254*** 
 (0.0503) (0.00485)  (0.0374) (0.00585) 
Age 0.927* -0.00641*  0.963 -0.00492 
 (0.0398) (0.00358)  (0.0330) (0.00440) 
Age-squared 1.001 4.66e-05  1.000 9.33e-06 
 (0.000511) (4.28e-05)  (0.000404) (5.21e-05) 
Male 1.019 0.00155  1.085 0.0106 
 (0.120) (0.00996)  (0.0992) (0.0119) 
Willingness to respond 0.979 -0.00180  0.615 -0.0627 
 (0.412) (0.0356)  (0.189) (0.0397) 
Constant 0.00340***   0.000963***  
  (0.00639)     (0.00139)   
Observations 4,292  4,659 
Pseudo R2 0,0419   0,0584 
Notes: Logit estimates. The second column shows the marginal effects, when all other variables equal their means. For categorical variables (that are not 
binary), the discrete change can be interpreted for a unit change centered on the mean. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
The standard errors are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual at the county level. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are 
statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, 10 percent level.  
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Table 3.  Determinants of search behavior. Stereotype logit estimates, marginal effects. 
 
Whole sample  Men  Women 
Intention Active search  Intention 
Active 
search  Intention 
Active 
search 
County unemployment rate  -0.0282** -0.0158**  -0.0147 -0.00788  -0.0512** -0.0302** 
 (0.0136) (0.00768)  (0.0205) (0.0109)  (0.0219) (0.0140) 
Log own-wage -0.0593*** -0.0332***  -0.0675*** -0.0361***  -0.0539** -0.0318** 
 (0.0123) (0.00808)  (0.0193) (0.0109)  (0.0241) (0.0135) 
Alternative wage is much less -0.148*** -0.0676***  -0.132*** -0.0578***  -0.170*** -0.0822*** 
 (0.0203) (0.00685)  (0.0244) (0.00751)  (0.0275) (0.0133) 
Alternative wage is somewhat less -0.0792*** -0.0402***  -0.0839*** -0.0399***  -0.0764*** -0.0415*** 
 (0.0184) (0.00719)  (0.0235) (0.00880)  (0.0185) (0.00897) 
Alternative wage is somewhat more 0.103*** 0.0735***  0.0927*** 0.0635***  0.123*** 0.0907*** 
 (0.0139) (0.0115)  (0.0173) (0.0174)  (0.0250) (0.0201) 
Alternative wage is much more 0.139*** 0.143***  0.137*** 0.162***  0.136*** 0.120*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0268)  (0.0155) (0.0438)  (0.0207) (0.0351) 
Wage cut 0.0615*** 0.0379***  0.0549*** 0.0320***  0.0727*** 0.0474*** 
 (0.00975) (0.00608)  (0.0161) (0.00918)  (0.0148) (0.0129) 
Date of last wage increase -0.0145*** -0.00813***  -0.0177** -0.00947**  -0.00935* -0.00551* 
 (0.00511) (0.00262)  (0.00780) (0.00402)  (0.00507) (0.00298) 
Wage discrimination 0.0160*** 0.00899***  0.0156*** 0.00836***  0.0176*** 0.0104*** 
 (0.00329) (0.00180)  (0.00387) (0.00193)  (0.00434) (0.00217) 
Superior-subordinate relationship 0.0677*** 0.0379***  0.0617*** 0.0330***  0.0760*** 0.0448*** 
 (0.00485) (0.00328)  (0.00421) (0.00304)  (0.00849) (0.00570) 
Position 0.0253*** 0.0142***  0.0216** 0.0115**  0.0324*** 0.0191*** 
 (0.00862) (0.00470)  (0.0105) (0.00559)  (0.0118) (0.00741) 
State owner -0.0561*** -0.0300***  -0.0713*** -0.0352***  -0.0344 -0.0199* 
 (0.0197) (0.00939)  (0.0259) (0.0114)  (0.0212) (0.0112) 
Union -0.0317** -0.0177**  -0.0353* -0.0188*  -0.0289 -0.0169 
 (0.0124) (0.00688)  (0.0185) (0.00964)  (0.0248) (0.0150) 
Tenure: from 1 to 4 years 0.0713*** 0.0420***  0.0818** 0.0477**  0.0582*** 0.0351*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0117)  (0.0342) (0.0214)  (0.0221) (0.0129) 
Tenure:  from 5 to 9 years 0.0396** 0.0237*  0.0614** 0.0370**  0.0101 0.00605 
 (0.0190) (0.0126)  (0.0287) (0.0188)  (0.0311) (0.0192) 
Tenure: 10 years or more -0.0293 -0.0158  -0.0240 -0.0124  -0.0264 -0.0151 
 (0.0206) (0.0114)  (0.0315) (0.0162)  (0.0337) (0.0194) 
Male 0.0350*** 0.0193***       
 (0.0123) (0.00636)       
Age 0.0160*** 0.00894***  0.0200*** 0.0107***  0.0129 0.00763 
 (0.00396) (0.00227)  (0.00503) (0.00290)  (0.00950) (0.00565) 
Age-sqared -0.000253*** -0.000142***  -0.000299*** -0.000160***  -0.000224* -0.000132* 
 (4.92e-05) (2.78e-05)  (6.59e-05) (3.78e-05)  (0.000122) (7.33e-05) 
Education 0.0612*** 0.0343***  0.0687*** 0.0367***  0.0499*** 0.0294*** 
 (0.00832) (0.00595)  (0.00875) (0.00532)  (0.0160) (0.0103) 
Household size -0.00992* -0.00556*  -0.00539 -0.00288  -0.0182** -0.0107** 
  (0.00556) (0.00324)   (0.00808) (0.00439)   (0.00819) (0.00427) 
Observations: 3,808  2,102  1,706 
Log pseudolikelihood -3297,09   -1910,58   -1372,7 
Notes: Stereotype logit estimates. The coefficients represent the marginal effects, when all other variables equal their means. For categorical 
variables (that are not binary), the discrete change can be interpreted for a unit change centered on the mean. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis. The standard errors are corrected for the potential clustering of the residual at the county level. The symbols ***, 
**, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at the 1, 5, 10 percent level. Sample weights are used. 
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Table 4.  Determinants of search behavior. Stereotype logit estimates, odds ratios 
 
Whole sample  Men  Women 
Odds ratio  Odds ratio  Odds ratio 
County unemployment rate  0.789**  0.878  0.664** 
 (0.0910)  (0.159)  (0.124) 
Log own-wage 0.607***  0.553***  0.650** 
 (0.0667)  (0.106)  (0.123) 
Alternative wage is much less 0.304***  0.332***  0.265*** 
 (0.0504)  (0.0667)  (0.0620) 
Alternative wage is somewhat less 0.523***  0.491***  0.551*** 
 (0.0737)  (0.0878)  (0.0800) 
Alternative wage is somewhat more 2.696***  2.520***  3.083*** 
 (0.362)  (0.527)  (0.800) 
Alternative wage is much more 5.758***  7.457***  4.175*** 
 (1.675)  (3.545)  (1.597) 
Wage cut 1.720***  1.652***  1.845*** 
 (0.146)  (0.230)  (0.252) 
Date of last wage increase 0.885***  0.856**  0.928* 
 (0.0357)  (0.0527)  (0.0377) 
Wage discrimination 1.145***  1.147***  1.151*** 
 (0.0323)  (0.0421)  (0.0366) 
Superior-subordinate relationship 1.769***  1.720***  1.835*** 
 (0.0698)  (0.0771)  (0.110) 
Position 1.238***  1.209**  1.295*** 
 (0.0904)  (0.110)  (0.123) 
State owner 0.628***  0.543***  0.761* 
 (0.0973)  (0.105)  (0.126) 
Union 0.766***  0.734*  0.795 
 (0.0785)  (0.121)  (0.157) 
Tenure: from 1 to 4 years 1.852***  2.117**  1.601*** 
 (0.281)  (0.668)  (0.281) 
Tenure: from  5 to 9 years 1.411**  1.769**  1.085 
 (0.238)  (0.469)  (0.273) 
Tenure: 10 years or more 0.784  0.812  0.812 
 (0.136)  (0.227)  (0.216) 
Male 1.341***     
 (0.138)     
Age 1.144***  1.192***  1.109 
 (0.0364)  (0.0573)  (0.0835) 
Age-sqared 0.998***  0.997***  0.998* 
 (0.000389)  (0.000633)  (0.000962) 
Education 1.676***  1.829***  1.490*** 
 (0.121)  (0.156)  (0.198) 
Household size 0.920*  0.954  0.865** 
 (0.0437)   (0.0680)   (0.0544) 
Observations: 3,808  2,102  1,706 
Log pseudolikelihood -3297,09   -1910,58   -1372,7 
Notes: Stereotype logit estimates. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. The standard erros are corrected for the 
potential clustering of the residual at the county level. The symbols ***, **, * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant, respectively, at 
the 1, 5, 10 percent level. Sample weights are used. 
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